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A THEORY OF CORPORATE SCANDALS:  
Why the U.S. and Europe Differ 
 
By John C. Coffee, Jr. 
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law 




 A wave of financial irregularity broke out in the United States in 2001-2002, 
culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A worldwide stock market bubble burst 
over this same period, with the actual market decline on a percentage basis being 
somewhat more severe in Europe. Yet, no corresponding wave of financial scandals 
involving a similar level of companies broke out in Europe. Indeed, those scandals that 
did arise in Europe often had American roots (e.g., Vivendi, Ahold, Adecco, etc.). Given 
the higher level of public and private enforcement in the United States for securities fraud, 
this contrast seems perplexing. 
 What explains this contrast? This paper submits that different kinds of scandals 
characterize different systems of corporate governance. In particular, dispersed 
ownership systems of governance are prone to the forms of earnings management that 
erupted in the United States, but concentrated ownership systems are much less 
vulnerable. Instead, the characteristic scandal in concentrated ownership economics is the 
appropriation of private benefits of control. Here, Parmalat is the representative scandal, 
just as Enron and WorldCom are the iconic examples of fraud in dispersed ownership 
regimes. 
 Is this difference meaningful? This article suggests that this difference in the 
likely source of, and motive for, financial misconduct has implications both for the utility 
of gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries and for design of legal controls to protect 
public shareholders. What works in one system will likely not work (at least as well) in 
the other. The difficulty in achieving auditor independence in a corporation with a 
controlling shareholder may also imply that minority shareholders in concentrated 
ownership economies should directly select their own gatekeepers.  
 - 1 -
A THEORY OF CORPORATE SCANDALS: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ 
 
By John C. Coffee, Jr.∗ 
 Corporate scandals, particularly when they occur in concentrated outbursts, raise 
serious issues that scholars have too long ignored. Two issues stand out:  First, why do 
different types of scandals occur in different economies? Second, why does a wave of 
scandals occur in one economy, but not in another, even though both economies are 
closely interconnected in the same global economy and subject to the same macro-
economic conditions? This brief essay will seek to relate answers to both questions to the 
structure of share ownership. 
 Conventional wisdom explains a sudden concentration of corporate financial 
scandals as the consequence of a stock market bubble. When the bubble burst, scandals 
follow, and, eventually, new regulation.1 Historically, this has been true at least since the 
South Seas Bubble, and this hypothesis works reasonably well to explain the turn-of-the-
millennium experience in the U.S. and Europe. Worldwide, a stock market bubble did 
burst in 2000, and in percentage terms the decline was greater in many European 
countries than in the United States.2 But in Europe, this sudden market decline was not 
associated with the same pervasive accounting and financial irregularity that shook the 
U.S. economy and produced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Indeed, financial statement 
restatements are rare in Europe.3 In contrast, the U.S. witnessed an accelerating crescendo 
of financial statement restatements that began in the late 1990s. The United States 
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) has found that over 10% of all listed companies in 
the United States announced at least one financial statement restatement between 1997 
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and 2002.4 Later studies have placed the number even higher.5 Because a financial 
statement restatement is a serious event in the United States that, depending on its 
magnitude, often results in a private class action, an SEC enforcement proceeding, a 
major stock price drop, and/or a management shake-up, one suspects that these 
announced restatements were but the tip of the proverbial iceberg, with many more 
companies negotiating changes in their accounting practices with their outside auditors 
that averted a formal restatement. 
 While Europe also had financial scandals over this same period (with the Parmalat 
scandal being the most notorious6), most were characteristically different than the U.S. 
style of earnings manipulation scandal (of which Enron and WorldCom were the iconic 
examples). Only European firms cross-listed in the United States seem to have 
encountered similar crises of earnings management.7 What explains this difference and 
the difference in frequency? This short essay will advance a simple, almost self-evident 
thesis: differences in the structure of share ownership account for differences in corporate 
scandals, both in terms of the nature of the fraud, the identity of the perpetrators, and the 
seeming disparity in the number of scandals at any given time. In dispersed ownership 
systems, corporate managers tend to be the rogues of the story, while in concentrated 
ownership systems, it is controlling shareholders who play the corresponding role. 
Although this point may seem obvious, its corollary is less so: the modus operandi of 
fraud is also characteristically different. Corporate managers tend to engage in earnings 
manipulation, while controlling shareholders tend to exploit the private benefits of 
control. Finally, and most importantly, given these differences, the role of gatekeepers in 
these two systems must necessarily also be different.8 While gatekeepers failed both at 
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Enron and Parmalat, they failed in characteristically different ways. In turn, different 
reforms may be justified, and the panoply of reforms adopted in the United States, 
culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, may not be the appropriate remedy in 
Europe. 
 Part I will review the recent American scandals to identify common denominators 
and the underlying motivation that caused the sudden eruption of financial statement 
restatements. Part II will turn to the evidence on private benefits of control in 
concentrated ownership systems. Patterns also emerge here in terms of the maturity of the 
capital market. Part III will advance some tentative conclusions about the differences in 
monitoring structures that are appropriate under different ownership regimes. 
 Part I. Fraud in Dispersed Ownership Systems 
 While studies differ, all show a rapid acceleration in financial statement 
restatements in the United States during the 1990s. The earliest of these studies finds that 
the number of earnings restatements by publicly held U.S. corporations averaged roughly 
forty-nine per year from 1990 to 1997, then increased to ninety-one in 1998, and then 
soared to 150 and 156 in 1999 and 2000, respectively.9 A later study by the United States 
General Accounting Office shows an even more dramatic acceleration, as set forth in 
Figure I:10 
 [Insert Figure I] 
Even this study understated the severity of this sudden spike in accounting irregularity. 
Because companies do not uniformly report a restatement in the same fashion, the GAO 
was not able to catch all restatements in its study. A more recent, fuller study in 2003 by 
Huron Consulting Group shows the following results:  in 1990, there were 33 earnings 
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restatements; in 1995, there were fifty;11 then, the rate truly accelerated to 216 in 1999; to 
233 in 2000; to 270 in 2001; and then in 2002, the number peaked at 330 (ten times the 
1990 level).12 On this basis, roughly one in eight listed companies restated over this 
period. An update this year by Huron Consulting shows that the number of restatements 
fell to 323 in 2003 and then rose again to 414 in 2004.13 
 Nor were these restatements merely technical adjustments. Although some 
actually increased earnings, the GAO study found that the typical restating firm lost an 
average 10% of its market capitalization over a three day trading period surrounding the 
date of the announcement.14 All told, the GAO estimated the total market losses 
(unadjusted for other market movements) at $100 billion for restating firms in its 
incomplete sample for 1997-2002.15 
 Other studies have reached similar results. Studying a comprehensive sample of 
firms that restated annual earnings from 1971 to 2000, Richardson, Tuna and Wu 
reported a negative market reaction to the announcement of the restatement of 11% over 
a three-day window surrounding the announcement.16 Moreover, using a wider window 
that measured firm value over a period beginning 120 days prior to the announcement to 
120 days after the announcement, they found that restating “firms lose on average 25 
percent of market value over the period examined and this is concentrated in a narrow 
window surrounding the announcement of the restatement.”17 25% of market value 
represents an extraordinary market penalty. It shows the market not simply to have been 
surprised, but to have taken the restatement as a signal of fraud. For example, in the cases 
of Cendant, MicroStrategy, and Sunbeam, three major U.S. corporate scandals in the late 
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1990s, they found that “these three firms lost more than $23 billion in the week 
surrounding their respective restatement announcements.”18 
 The intensity of the market’s negative reaction to an earnings restatement appears 
to be greatest when the restatement involved revenue recognition issues.19 One study 
examining just the period from 1997 to 1999 found that firms in which revenue 
recognition issues caused the restatement experienced a market adjusted loss of -13.38% 
over a window period beginning three days before the announcement and continuing until 
three days after the announcement.20 Yet, despite the market’s fear of such practices, 
revenue recognition errors became the dominant cause of restatements in the period from 
1997 to 2002. The GAO Report found that revenue recognition issues accounted for 
almost 38 percent of the restatements it identified over that period,21 and the Huron 
Consulting Group study also found it to be the leading accounting issue underlying an 
earnings restatement between 1999 and 2003.22 
 The prevalence of revenue recognition problems, even in the face of the market’s 
sensitivity to them, shows a significant change in managerial behavior in the United 
States. During earlier periods, U.S. managements famously employed “rainy day 
reserves” to hold back the recognition of income that was in excess of the market’s 
expectation in order to defer its recognition until some later quarter when there had been 
a shortfall in expected earnings. In effect, managers engage in income-smoothing, rolling 
the peaks in one period over into the valley of the next period. This traditional form of 
earnings management was intended to mask the volatility of earnings and reassure 
investors who might have been alarmed by rapid fluctuations in earnings. In contrast, 
managers in the late 1990s appear to have characteristically “stolen” earnings from future 
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periods in order to create an earnings spike that potentially could not be sustained. Why? 
Although it had long been known that restating firms were typically firms with high 
market expectations for future growth, the pressure on these firms to show a high rate of 
earnings growth appears to have increased during the 1990s. 
 What, in turn, caused this increased pressure? To a considerable extent, it appears 
to have been self-induced – that is, the product of increasingly optimistic predictions by 
managements to financial analysts as to future earnings. But this answer just translates 
the prior question into a different format: Why did managements become more optimistic 
about earnings growth over this period? Here, one explanation does distinguish the U.S. 
from Europe, and it has increasingly been viewed as the best explanation for the sudden 
spike in financial irregularity in the U.S.23 Put simply, executive compensation abruptly 
shifted in the United States during the 1990s, moving from a cash-based system to an 
equity based system. More importantly, this shift was not accompanied by any 
compensating change in corporate governance to control the predictably perverse 
incentives that reliance on stock options can create. 
 One measure of the suddenness of this shift is the change over the decade in the 
median compensation of a CEO of an S&P 500 Industrial company. As of 1990, the 
median such CEO made $1.25 million with 92% of that amount paid in cash and 8% in 
equity.24 But during the 1990s, both the scale and composition of executive compensation 
changed. By 2001, the median CEO of an S&P industrial company was earning over $6 
million, of which 66% was in equity.25 Figure II shows the swiftness of this transition:26  
 [Insert Figure II]  
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To illustrate the impact of this change, assume a CEO holds options on two million 
shares of his company’s stock and that the company is trading at a price to earnings ratio 
of 30 to 1 (both reasonable assumptions for this era). On this basis, if the CEO can cause 
the “premature” recognition of revenues that result in an increase in annual earnings by 
simply $1 per share, the CEO has caused a $30 price increase that should make him $60 
million richer. Not a small incentive! 
 Obviously, when one pays the CEO with stock options, one creates incentives for 
short-term financial manipulation and accounting gamesmanship. Financial economists 
have found a strong statistical correlation between higher levels of equity compensation 
and both earnings management and financial restatements. One recent study by Efendi, 
Srivastava and Swanson utilized a control group methodology and constructed two 
groups of companies, each composed of 100 listed public companies.27 The first group’s 
members had restated their financial statements in 2001 or 2002, while the control group 
was composed of otherwise similar firms that had not restated. What characteristic most 
distinguished the two groups? The leading factor that proved most to influence the 
likelihood of a restatement was the presence of a substantial amount of “in the money” 
stock options in the hands of the firm’s CEO. The CEOs of the firms in the restating 
group held on average “in the money” options of $30.9 million, while CEOs in the non-
restating control group averaged only $2.3 million – a nearly 14 to 1 difference.28 Further, 
if a CEO held options equaling or exceeding 20 times his or her annual salary (and this 
was the 80th percentile in their study – meaning that a substantial number of CEOs did 
exceed this level), the likelihood of a restatement increased by 55%. 
 - 8 -
 Other studies have reached similar results. Denis, Hanouna, and Sarin find a 
significant positive relationship between a firm’s use of option-based compensation and 
securities fraud allegations being leveled against the firm.29 Further, they find in their 
study of 358 companies charged with fraud between 1993 and 2002 that the likelihood of 
a fraud charge is positively related to “option intensity” – i.e. the greater the amount of 
the options, the higher the likelihood.30 Similarly, Cheng and Warfield have documented 
that corporate managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent 
periods, are more likely to report earnings that just meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts, 
and more frequently engage in other forms of earnings management.31 As stock options 
increase the managers’ equity ownership, they also increase their need to diversify the 
high risk associated with such ownership, and this produces both more efforts to inflate 
earnings to prevent a stock price decline and increased sales by managers in advance of 
any earnings decline. In short, there is a “dark side” to option-based compensation for 
senior executives: absent special controls, more options means more fraud. 
 At this point, the contrast between managerial incentives in the U.S. and Europe 
comes into clearer focus. These differences involve both the scale of compensation and 
its composition. In 2004, CEO compensation as a multiple of average employee 
compensation was estimated to be 531:1 in the U.S., but only 16:1 in France, 11:1 in 
Germany, 10:1 in Japan, and 21:1 in nearby Canada. Even Great Britain, with the most 
closely similar system of corporate governance to the U.S., had only a 25:1 ratio.32 But 
even more important is the shift towards compensating the chief executive primarily with 
stock options. While stock options have come to be widely used in recent years in Europe, 
equity compensation constitutes a much lower percentage of total CEO compensation 
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(even in the U.K., it was only 24% in 2002).33 European CEOs not only make much less, 
but their total compensation is also much less performance related.34 
 What explains these differences? Compensation experts in the U.S. usually 
emphasize the tax laws in the United States, which were amended in the early 1990s to 
restrict the corporate deductibility of high cash compensation and thus induced 
corporations to use equity in preference to cash.35 But this is only part of the fuller story. 
Much of the explanation is that institutional investors in the U.S. pressured companies for 
a shift towards equity compensation. Why? Institutional investors, who hold the majority 
of the stock in publicly held companies in the U.S., understand that, in a system of 
dispersed ownership, executive compensation is probably their most important tool by 
which to align managerial incentives with shareholder incentives. Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, they had seen senior managements of large corporations manage their firms in 
a risk-averse and growth-maximizing fashion, retaining “free cash flow” to the maximum 
extent possible. Such a style of management produced the bloated, and inefficient 
conglomerates of that era (for example, Gulf & Western and IT&T). Put simply, a system 
of exclusively cash compensation creates incentives to avoid risk and bankruptcy and to 
maximize the size of the firm, regardless of profitability, because a larger firm size 
generally implies higher cash compensation for its senior managers. 
 Once the U.S. tax laws and institutional pressure together produced a shift to 
equity compensation in the 1990s, managers’ incentives changed, and managers sought to 
maximize share value (as the institutions had wanted). But what the institutions failed to 
anticipate was that there can be too much of a good thing. Aggressive use of these 
incentives in turn encouraged the use of manipulative techniques to maximize stock price 
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over the short-run. Although such spikes may not be sustainable, corporate managers 
possess asymmetric information, and anticipating their inability to maintain earnings 
growth, they can exercise their options and bail out. 
 One measure of this transition is the changing nature of financial irregularities. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC to study all its enforcement proceedings over 
the prior five years (i.e., 1997-2002) to ascertain what kinds of financial and accounting 
irregularities were the most common. Out of the 227 “enforcement matters” pursued by 
the SEC over this period, the SEC has reported that 126 (or 55%) alleged “improper 
revenue recognition.”36 Similarly, the earlier noted GAO Study found that 38% of all 
restatements in its survey were for revenue recognition timing errors. Either managers 
were recognizing the next period’s revenues prematurely – or managers were simply 
inventing revenues that did not exist. Both forms of errors suggest that managers were 
striving to manufacture an artificial (and possibly unsustainable) spike in corporate 
income. 
 That managers were able to optimistically predict and prematurely recognize 
revenues in ways that ultimately compelled earnings restatements shows a market failure 
– particularly when the market penalty for premature revenue recognition was, as earlier 
noted, so Draconian as to result in a 25% decline in market price on average.37 Why did 
securities analysts accept such optimistic predictions and not discount them? Here, the 
evidence is that very few analysts downgraded public companies in the months prior to 
earnings restatements – even though short sellers and insiders had recognized the 
likelihood of an earnings restatement.38 Yet, while analysts and auditors may have been 
slow to recognize premature revenue recognition, considerable evidence suggests that 
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short sellers were able to recognize the signals and profit handsomely by anticipating 
earnings restatements.39 The implications of this point are that smart traders could and did 
do what professional gatekeepers were insufficiently motivated to do: recognize the 
approach of major market collapses. In short, this is a story of “gatekeeper failure” in that 
the professional agents of corporate governance did not adequately serve investors. In 
consequence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 understandably focused on gatekeepers 
and contained provisions regulating auditors, securities analysts and credit-rating 
agencies. 
 Part II. Fraud in Concentrated Ownership Regimes. 
 The pattern in concentrated ownership systems is very different, but not 
necessarily better. In the case of most European corporations, there is a controlling 
shareholder or shareholder group. Why is this important? A controlling shareholder does 
not need to rely on indirect mechanisms of control, such as equity compensation or stock 
options, in order to incentivize management. Rather, it can rely on a “command and 
control” system because, unlike the dispersed shareholders in the U.S., it can directly 
monitor and replace management. Hence, corporate managers have both less discretion to 
engage in opportunistic earnings management and less motivation to create an earnings 
spike (because it will not benefit a management not compensated with stock options). 
 Equally important, the controlling shareholder also has much less interest in the 
day-to-day stock price of its company. Why? Because the controlling shareholder seldom, 
if ever, sells its control block into the public market. Rather, if it sells at all, it will make a 
privately negotiated sale at a substantial premium over the market price to an incoming, 
new controlling shareholder. Such control premiums are characteristically much higher in 
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Europe than in the United States. As a result, controlling shareholders in Europe do not 
obsess over the day-to-day market price and rationally do not engage in tactics to 
prematurely recognize revenues to spike their stock price. These two explanations – 
lesser use of equity compensation and lesser interest in the short-term stock price – 
explain at least in part why there were less accounting irregularities in Europe than in the 
U.S. during the late 1990s. 
 This generalization may seem subject to counter-examples. For example, some 
well-known European companies – e.g., Vivendi Universal, Royal Ahold, Skandia 
Insurance or Adecco40 – did experience accounting irregularities. But these are 
exceptions that prove the rule. All were U.S. listed companies whose accounting 
problems emanated from U.S. based subsidiaries or that had transformed themselves into 
American-style conglomerates (the leading example being Vivendi) that either awarded 
stock options or needed to maximize their short-term stock price in order to make 
multiple acquisitions. 
 Does this analysis imply that European managers are more ethical or that 
European shareholders are better off than their American counterparts? By no means! 
Concentrated ownership encourages a different type of financial overreaching:  the 
extraction of private benefits of control. Dyck and Zingales have shown that the private 
benefits of control vary significantly across jurisdictions, ranging from -4% to +65%, 
depending in significant part on the legal protections given minority shareholders.41 
While there is evidence that the market cares about the level of private benefits that 
controlling shareholders will extract,42 the market has a relatively weak capacity to 
discern on a real time basis what benefits are in fact being expropriated. 
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 In emerging markets, the expropriation of private benefits typically occurs 
through financial transactions. Ownership may be diluted through public offerings, and 
then a coercive tender offer or squeeze-out merger is used to force minority shareholders 
to tender at a price below fair market value. These techniques have been discussed in 
detail elsewhere and in their crudest forms have been given the epithet “tunneling” to 
describe them.43 A classic example was the Bulgarian experience between 1999 and 2002, 
when roughly two-thirds of the 1,040 firms on the Bulgarian stock exchange were 
delisted, following freeze-out tender offers for the minority shares at below market, but 
still coercive, prices.44 
 In more developed economies, such financial transactions may be precluded. 
Instead, “operational” mechanisms can be used: for example, controlling shareholders 
can compel the company to sell its output to, or buy its raw materials from, a corporation 
that they independently own. In emerging markets, growing evidence suggests that firms 
within corporate groups engage in more related party transactions that firms that are not 
members of a controlled group.45 In essence, these transactions permit controlling 
shareholders to transfer resources from companies in which they have lesser cash flow 
rights to ones in which they have greater cash flow rights.46  
 Although it may be tempting to deem “tunneling” and related opportunistic 
practices as characteristic only of emerging markets where legal protections are still 
evolving, considerable evidence suggests that such practices are also prevalent in more 
“mature” European economies.47 Indeed, some students of European corporate 
governance claim that the dominant form of concentrated ownership (i.e., absolute 
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majority ownership) is simply inefficient because it permits too much predatory 
misbehavior.48  
 This provocative question need not here be resolved, but the nature of the 
scandals that characterize concentrated ownership systems does merit our attention 
because they show a distinct and different type of gatekeeper failure. Two recent scandals 
typify this pattern:  Parmalat and Hollinger. Parmalat is the paradigmatic fraud for 
Europe (just as Enron and WorldCom are the representative frauds in the United States). 
Parmalat’s fraud essentially involved the balance sheet, not the income statement. It 
failed when a 3.9 billion euros account with Bank of America proved to be fictitious.49 At 
least, $17.4 billion in assets seemed to vanish from its balance sheet. Efforts by its trustee 
to track down these missing funds appear to have found that at least 2.3 billion euros 
were paid to affiliated persons and shareholders.50 In short, private benefits appear to 
have siphoned off to controlling shareholders through related party transactions. Unlike 
the short-term stock manipulations that occur in the U.S., this was a scandal that had 
continued for many years, probably for over a decade. 
 At the heart of the Parmalat fraud, there was also a failure by its gatekeepers. 
Parmalat’s auditors for many years had been an American-based firm, Grant Thornton, 
whose personnel had audited Parmalat and its subsidiaries since the 1980s.51 Although 
Italian law uniquely mandated the rotation of audit firms, Grant, Thornton found an easy 
evasion. It gave up the role of being auditor to the parent company in the Parmalat family, 
but continued to audit its subsidiaries.52 Among these subsidiaries was the Caymans 
Islands based subsidiary, Boulat Financing Corporation, whose books showed the 
fictitious Bank of America account whose discovery triggered Parmalat’s insolvency.53 
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 The recent Hollinger scandal also involved overreaching by controlling 
shareholders. Although Hollinger International is a Delaware corporation, its controlling 
shareholders were Canadian, as were most of its shareholders. According to the report 
prepared by counsel to its independent directors, former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, 
Hollinger was a “kleptocracy”.54 Its controlling shareholders allegedly siphoned off more 
than $400 million from Hollinger – or more than 95% of the company’s adjusted net 
income from 1997 to 2003.55 On sales of assets by Hollinger, its controlling shareholders 
secretly took large side payments, which they directed be paid to themselves out of the 
sales proceeds.56 But bad as the Hollinger case may be, little evidence suggest that Lord 
Black and his cronies manipulated earnings through premature revenue recognition. What 
this contrast shows is that controlling shareholders may misappropriate assets, but have 
much less reason to fabricate earnings. This does not mean that business ethics are better 
(or worse) within a concentrated ownership regime, but only that the modus operandi for 
fraud is different. The real conclusion is that different systems of ownership encourage 
characteristically different styles of fraud. 
 Part III. Gatekeeper Failure Across Ownership Regimes 
 Both ownership regimes – dispersed and concentrated – show evidence of 
gatekeeper failure. The U.S./U.K. system of dispersed ownership is vulnerable to 
gatekeepers not detecting inflated earnings, and concentrated ownership systems fail to 
the extent that gatekeepers miss (or at least fail to report) the expropriation of private 
benefits. A key difference, of course, is that in dispersed ownership systems the villains 
are managers and the victims are shareholders, while, in concentrated ownership systems, 
the controlling shareholders overreach minority shareholders. 
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 In turn, this raises the critical issue:  can gatekeepers in concentrated ownership 
systems monitor the controlling shareholder who hires (and potentially can fire) them? 
Although there clearly have been numerous failures by gatekeepers in dispersed 
ownership systems, the answer for these systems probably lies in principle in redesigning 
the governance circuitry within the public corporation so that the gatekeeper does not 
report to those that it is expected to monitor. Thus, the auditor or attorney can be required 
to report to an independent audit committee rather than corporate managers. But this 
same answer does not work as well in a concentrated ownership system. In such a system, 
even an independent audit committee may serve at the pleasure of a controlling 
shareholder. 
 Indeed, some forms of gatekeepers common in dispersed ownership systems seem 
inherently less likely to be effective in a system of concentrated ownership. For example, 
the securities analyst is inherently a gatekeeper for dispersed ownership regimes. In 
concentrated ownership regimes, the volume of stock trading in its thinner capital 
markets is likely to be insufficient to generate brokerage commissions sufficient to 
support a profession of analysts covering all publicly held companies. But even if analyst 
coverage in concentrated ownership regimes were equivalent to that in dispersed 
ownership systems, the analyst’s predictions of the firm’s future earnings or value would 
still mean less to public shareholders if the controlling shareholder remained in a position 
to squeeze-out the minority shareholders.  
 Even the role of the auditor differs in a concentrated ownership system. The 
existence of a controlling shareholder necessarily affects auditor independence. In a 
dispersed ownership system, corporate managers might sometimes “capture” the audit 
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partner of their auditor (as seemingly happened at Enron). But the policy answer was 
obvious (and Sarbanes-Oxley quickly adopted it): rewire the internal circuitry so that the 
auditor reported to an independent audit committee. However, in a concentrated 
ownership system, this answer works less well because the auditor is still reporting to a 
board that is, itself, potentially subservient to the controlling shareholder. Thus, the 
auditor in this system is a monitor who cannot effectively escape the control of the party 
that it is expected to monitor. Although diligent auditors could have presumably detected 
the fraud at Parmalat (at least to the extent of detecting the fictitious bank account at the 
Cayman Islands subsidiary), one suspects that they would have likely been dismissed at 
the point at which they began to monitor earnestly. More generally, auditors can do little 
to stop squeeze-out mergers, coercive tender offers, or even unfair related party 
transactions. These require statutory protections if the minority’s rights are to be 
protected. In fairness, shareholders in a concentrated ownership system may receive some 
protection from other gatekeepers, including the large banks that typically monitor the 
corporation.  
 There is an important historical dimension to this point. The independent auditor 
arose in Britain in the middle 19th Century, just as industrialization and the growth of 
railroads was compelling corporations to market their shares to a broader audience of 
investors.57 Amendments in 1844 and 1845 to the British Companies Act required an 
annual statutory audit with the auditor being selected by the shareholders.58 This made 
sense, because the auditor was thus placed in a true principal/agent relationship with the 
shareholders who relied on it. But this same relationship does not exist when the auditor 
reports to shareholders in a system in which there is a controlling shareholder. Finally, 
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even if the auditor is asked to report on the fairness of inter-corporate dealings or related 
party transactions, this is not its core competence. Other protections – such as 
supermajority votes, mandatory bid requirements, or prophylactic rules – may be far 
more valuable in protecting minority shareholders when there is a controlling shareholder. 
This may explain the slower development of auditing procedures and internal controls in 
Europe. 
 Potentially, there is a further implication for the use of gatekeepers in 
concentrated ownership economies. If the controlling shareholder can potentially 
dominate the selection of the auditor or other gatekeepers, then it becomes at least 
arguable that if the auditor is to serve as an effective reputational intermediary, it should 
be selected by the minority shareholders and report to them. This article will not attempt 
to design such an unprecedented system, but will smugly content itself with pointing out 
the likely inadequacy of alternative systems. The second-best alternative would appear to 
be according the auditor’s selection, retention and compensation to the independent 
directors. 
Conclusion 
 This article’s generalizations are not presented as iron laws. “Private benefits of 
control” can be misappropriated in a U.S. public company, and recent illustrations 
include the Tyco and Adelphia scandals. Similarly, companies with dispersed ownership 
are now common (but still the minority) in Europe. Public policy needs, however, to start 
from the recognition that dispersed ownership creates managerial incentives to 
manipulate income, while concentrated ownership invites the low-visibility extraction of 
private benefits. As a result, governance protections that work in one system may fail in 
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the other. Even more importantly, different gatekeepers need to be designed into different 
governance systems to monitor for different abuses. 
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